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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On September 16, 2010, police presented an application for a search
warrant for the residence of Amy Faye Greco.

(See generally Warrant Tr.)

Police Chief Dusty Tveidt testified that a relative of Greco named Mel reported
concerns about drug-related activities within Greco's residence. (Warrant Tr., p.
2, L. 16 - p. 4, L. 5.) Mel reported the Greco lived there with her grandmother
and that he suspected her of stealing the grandmother's medicines because the
medicines were gone when he or his wife visited to check on the grandmother.
(Warrant Tr., p. 4, Ls. 7-12; p. 4, L. 19 - p. 5, L. 2.) He also reported persons
coming and visiting Greco in her room for a couple of minutes and then leaving
again in what Mel suspected were drug transactions. (Warrant Tr., p. 4, Ls. 1215.)

Mel also reported that Greco had installed a video camera monitoring

system whereby Greco could monitor activities outside of the residence.
(Warrant Tr., p. 4, Ls. 15-18.)
Chief Tveidt followed up on Mel's report, and police witnessed several
different vehicles frequent the residence over the course of about a week.
(Warrant Tr., p. 5, Ls. 3-12.) The police also received a report from the principal
of Wilder Elementary that Greco's 11-year-old son

had been reported by

fellow students to have been talking about smoking marijuana. (Warrant Tr., p.
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5, L. 21 - p. 6, L. 3.) Health and Welfare reported that another child in their care
had reported that
pot.

had been using threats to get other children to smoke

(Warrant Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-10.)

Chief Tveidt interviewed

who

admitted smoking marijuana and having paraphernalia in his room. (Warrant Tr.
p. 6, Ls. 11-25.)

also stated that every evening Greco is visited by "four

to five" "friends" that come over and "go into a room for five minutes or so and
leave." (Warrant Tr., p. 6, Ls. 18-22.)
Based on this evidence the magistrate issued a search warrant. (Warrant
Tr.,

p.

8,

Ls.

18-24.)

While

executing

the

warrant

officers

found

methamphetamine, marijuana and paraphernalia. (R., p. 7.) The state charged
Greco with possession of a controlled substance and injury to a child. (R., pp.
22-23.) Greco moved to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the
search warrant, contending that there had been an illegal warrantless entry prior
to obtaining the warrant. (R., pp. 35-40.) Regarding that entry, the district court
found the following:
Chief Tveidt traveled to the subject residence.
The
defendant's grandmother answered the door. The defendant then
stepped outside the residence to talk with Tveidt. The defendant
consented to the search of her son's room. Tveidt then asked to
search the whole house. The defendant did not consent and
indicated that she needed to ask her grandmother for consent to
search. The defendant walked into the house. Tveidt followed her
inside without invitation. After entering the house the defendant
went into her room and closed the door. Tveidt heard clanging
glass and thought the defendant was destroying evidence so he
ordered the defendant out of her room and then detained the
defendant and a man, who was in her room, so law enforcement
could obtain a search warrant. Tveidt entered into the defendant's
room to check on the infant that was in the room, and at that point
he saw the video monitor [Greco] had set up to view the perimeter
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of the house. The monitor displayed Wilder patrol vehicles parked
on the street in front of the residence.
(R., p. 81.)

The court concluded that because Greco consented to only the

search of a single room and not a "search of the entire home" Chief Tveidt's entry
into the home was "unlawful." (R., pp. 84-86.) Because Chief Tveidt was in the
home unlawfully when he heard Greco potentially destroying evidence, the
exigent circumstances exception did not apply. (R., pp. 86-88.) The court then
excluded from the search warrant application the evidence of the monitor seen
during the entry it found illegal and concluded the remaining evidence was
insufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant because Mel and
Anthony's statements to Chief Tveidt were "uncorroborated hearsay" with no
"indicia of reliability." (R., p. 89-92.) The state filed a timely appeal from the
order suppressing evidence found in the execution of the search warrant. (R.,
pp. 97-99.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it concluded that consent to search one
room of the house did not grant consent to enter the house?

2.

Alternatively, even if the entry into the home were illegal and all evidence
found as a result thereof were excluded from the search warrant
application, did the district court err by concluding the remaining evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause?
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ARGUMENT

I.
The Entry Into The Home Was Within The Scope Of The Consent

A.

Introduction
The district court found that Greco "consented to the search of her son's

room." (R., p. 81.) However, because the officer lacked consent to a "search of
the entire home," his "entry was unlawful." (R., p. 86.) The district court erred
because entry into the home was within the scope of the consent.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated:

when a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

Consent To Enter The House Was Within The Scope Of The Consent To
Search A Room Within The House
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal

and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693,
695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)). The courts have long approved consensual searches
because "it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they
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have been permitted to do so." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
The standard for determining the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of objective reasonableness.

kl

at 250-51. The question is

what a typical, reasonable person would have understood by the exchange
between the suspect and the officer.

kl

at 250; see also State v. Thorpe, 141

Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at
251).
Here it is undisputed that Greco consented to a search of her son's room.
A typical, reasonable person would have understood that this would involve entry
into the house. The district court's holding that Chief Tveidt exceeded the scope
of the consent when he entered the house is erroneous and should be reversed.

D.

Exigent Circumstances Justified Ordering Greco From Her Room And
Locating Her Three-Year-Old Child
Exigent circumstances such as probable cause to believe evidence is

being destroyed justify warrantless police action to preserve evidence unless the
police have engaged in conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky
v. King,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856-62 (2011). Here the district court
rejected exigent circumstances as grounds for Chief Tveidt's actions to preserve
evidence and assure the welfare of a toddler solely on the basis that his initial
entry had been illegal. (R., pp. 86-89.) As demonstrated, the initial entry was not
illegal but was within the scope of the consent. Therefore the district court erred
in rejecting exigent circumstances as grounds for exceeding the scope of the
consent to make limited entry into Greco's bedroom.
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Application of the correct legal standards to the facts as found by the
district court shows error.

Chief Tveidt did not exceed the scope of Greco's

consent to search a bedroom of the house when he entered the house. The
district court therefore erred by holding the entry was illegal and suppressing
evidence flowing there from.

11.
Alternatively, The Search Warrant Application Established Probable Cause Even
In The Absence Of The Evidence Found In The House
A.

Introduction
The only evidence included in the search warrant application found by

Chief Tveidt in Greco's house was his observation of a monitor showing activity
outside the house. (Warrant Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-20.) Even assuming this evidence
to have been improperly obtained by the police, excluding it from the warrant
application shows ample evidence to establish probable cause.

8.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing whether a magistrate court properly issued a search warrant,

"the appellate court's function is limited to insuring that the magistrate had a
'substantial basis' for concluding that probable cause existed, with great
deference paid to the magistrate's determination." State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho
365, 369, 93 P.3d 696, 700 (2004) (citations omitted). See also Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983); State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 639, 873 P.2d 891,
893 (Ct. App. 1993).

In determining whether probable cause existed, the

reviewing court should give preference to the validity of the warrant.
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State v.

Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 10-11, 794 P.2d 278, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1990). See also
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (there is a presumption of validity
in the affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant).

A defendant

challenging a search pursuant to a search warrant bears the burden of proving
any constitutional violation.

State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 287, 141 P.3d

1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2006).

C.

The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law When It Deemed Information
From Mel And
To Be Unreliable
"In determining the validity of a search warrant whose underlying

application contains illegally obtained information, the ultimate question is
whether the remaining information presented to the magistrate, after the tainted
evidence is excluded, contains adequate facts from which the magistrate could
have included that probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant."
State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 779, 992 P.2d 769, 774 (1999) (internal
quotations omitted); see also State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 116, 175 P.3d
801, 805 (Ct. App. 2007). Probable cause is based on "a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before [the magistrate], including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213,238 (1983).
Here Mel, a relative of Greco and her grandmother, informed police of
suspected drug dealing activities by Greco within the house based on his and his
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wife's observations. Specifically, Mel reported that Greco had a steady stream of
casual visitors that would come, spend about five minutes with Greco in her
room, and then leave again, and that Greco had set up video surveillance of the
outside of her house.

Both Greco's son,

and police observation

confirmed the steady stream of causal short-term visits.

also provided

evidence of his own marijuana use in the house and that paraphernalia was
present inside. This created a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity
was present in the house.
The district court concluded the issuing magistrate could not credit Mel
and Anthony's statements because there was "no evidence" that Mel was a
"reliable informant" and Mel and Anthony's "uncorroborated hearsay statements"
did not "bear an indicia of reliability."

(R., pp. 91-92.)

determination is directly contrary to applicable law.

The district court's

It is well established that

information from a known "citizen informant," as opposed to an anonymous
informant or member of the criminal milieu, is deemed reliable; the citizen's
disclosure of his or her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if the
allegations turn out to be fabricated, is generally deemed sufficient to show the
citizen informant's veracity and reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34; Dunlap v.
State, 126 Idaho 901, 907, 894 P.2d 134, 140 (Ct. App. 1995); see also State v.
Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-102, 15 P.3d 334, 336-337 (Ct. App. 2000). Because
Mel's information came from a known citizen informant it was properly deemed
reliable by the magistrate. Even if corroboration was required, Mel's information
was corroborated by police observation (other than the existence of the monitor),
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and Mel's and Anthony's statements, many of which were against Anthony's own
interests, corroborated each other. The district court erred as a matter of law
when it concluded that, absent the information of Chief Tveidt's observation of
the monitor, information from Mel and

was not reliable.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings.

DATED this 29th day of June, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of June 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARA B. THOMAS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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